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Some experts have argued that patients should rou-
tinely be told the specific magnitude and absolute
probability of potential risks and benefits of screening
tests. This position is motivated by the idea that
framing risk information in ways that are less precise
violates the ethical principle of respect for autonomy and
its application in informed consent or shared decision-
making. In this Perspective, we consider a number of
problems with this view that have not been adequately
addressed. The most important challenges stem from
the danger that patients will misunderstand the infor-
mation or have irrational responses to it. Any initiative
in this area should take such factors into account and
should consider carefully how to apply the ethical
principles of respect for autonomy and beneficence.
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INTRODUCTION
When a patient is considering whether to undergo a preventive
service such as a screening test, the relevant information to
guide a decision includes the probability of risk and benefit.1,2
Some have argued that all patients considering preventive
services should be given this information in the form of
absolute probabilities, presented numerically or graphically.2–9
This claim is based on the worry that failing to give patients
this type of risk information violates the ethical principle of
respect for autonomy,10 since without this information patients
are unable to make a fully informed decision.
In this Perspective, we point to a number of problems with
this view that have not been adequately addressed. Most
important is the danger that statements of absolute risk and
benefit will confusemany patients, leading to negative effects on
patient autonomy and health outcomes. Although various steps
could be taken to offset these problems, we argue that there is a
significant chance that such steps would be inadequate. There
are also important questions about how to apply respect for
autonomy and other ethical principles in this area.
Any initiative to provide absolute risk and benefit informa-
tion to patients must take these issues into account. We limit
our discussion to recommended screening tests such as
mammograms, but similar issues arise when considering
patient understanding of any preventive test or treatment.
PATIENT UNDERSTANDING AND FRAMING OF RISK/
BENEFIT DATA
Many patients currently are not given adequate information
about recommended screening tests. Research shows that
primary-care providers provide very limited information when
ordering a test, often doing little more than describing its
purpose.11,12 Similarly, health information about screening
tests provided by brochures or on the Internet often gives
incomplete information and varies widely in quality.13,14
Moreover, the risks of false positives, false negatives, and
over-treatment are rarely described.13,14 In addition, research
shows that individuals overestimate the benefits and underes-
timate the possible risks of screening.15–17
All these observations suggest that in this area the medical
establishment is failing to respect patient autonomy, one of the
central principles of medical ethics.10 This principle requires,
among other things, that patients guide their health care by
providing informed consent to proposed interventions18 or by
participating in shared decision-making.19–21 While the ways
that patients consent for invasive procedures, such as surgery,
often are subjected to more intense scrutiny than for low-risk
interventions, such as mammograms, the same principle
applies.18,21 Unless the patient has an adequate understanding
of the possible benefits, harms, and alternatives to the proce-
dure, he or she cannot give adequate informed consent.18,20
But how much information is enough? Any quantitative
data can be described in many ways, and research shows that
such framing has significant effects on patient understand-
ing.22,23 Consider the various ways to frame the risks and
benefits of mammograms in women over 50 years old, a test
that is recommended by the US Preventive Services Task
Force.24 The most complete representation is in the form of
natural frequencies, which present the expected probabilities of
various outcomes in a population of 1,000 women undergoing
screening compared to an equivalent population that is not
being screened.4 According to one model, out of 1,000 women
who are screened biannually for 10 years, 178 will be called
back for repeat imaging, 64 will have a biopsy, and 33 will be
diagnosed as having breast cancer.25 Over 20 years, there will
be 14 deaths from breast cancer in the unscreened group, and
just 9.1 in the group undergoing mammography.25
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There are other ways to describe the risks and benefits of
mammograms using absolute probabilities. For instance, the
absolute risk reduction (ARR) is calculated by subtracting
the mortality rate in the screened group from that of the
unscreened group. Thus, the ARR of performing mammogra-
phy regularly for 20 years is 4.9 per 1,000 (or 0.49%), i.e., 14
per 1,000 (1.4%) minus 9.1 per 1,000 (0.91%).25 Another
absolute measure of benefit is the number needed to screen
(NNS), which describes how many people have to be screened
and provided follow-up testing and treatment to save one
person (a slightly modified form of the number needed to treat
(NNT) measure).26 According to the model above, roughly 204
women have to be screened for 20 years to save one from dying
of breast cancer during that time period.25
However, patients are rarely given such absolute measures
of possible benefit. In one study, just 22% of brochures
concerning mammography quantified the benefit at all, and
those that did only provided the relative risk reduction (RRR).13
RRR is calculated by dividing the decrease in morbidity or
mortality by the baseline rate. Using the same model as above,
mammograms performed over 20 years provide a RRR of 36%,
i.e., 4.9 per 1,000 decrease in death from breast cancer divided
by the baseline rate (in the unscreened group) of 14 per 1,000.25
In this case as in others, the RRR (36%) is amuch larger number
than the ARR (0.5%), and so it is not surprising that brochures
that aim to encourage patients to get regular mammograms
generally present RRR if numbers are given at all.13 Research
confirms that patients are more likely to accept a preventive
intervention when its benefit is described in terms of RRR than
ARR and are least likely to accept when NNT is given.22
Other screening tests offer similar levels of risk reduction, so
the same framing issues arise. For example, colon cancer
screening with annual fecal occult blood testing over 18 years
produces an ARR of dying of colon cancer over this period of
just 4.6 per 1,000 (0.46%).27 In other words, 217 patients
must undergo annual screening for 18 years to prevent one
death from colon cancer. But the RRR is 31%, obtained by
dividing the ARR by the baseline rate of death from colon
cancer during this time period (roughly 15 per 1,000).
ARGUMENTS FOR PROVIDING ABSOLUTE RISK
AND BENEFIT DATA
A number of experts argue that patients should always be given
information about risks and benefits using absolute probabili-
ties.2–9 Some favor natural frequencies,3–5 while others are
comfortable with other absolute measures, such as ARR or
NNS.2,6,7,9 As mentioned above, this position is motivated by
the worry that giving less information violates the ethical
principle of respect for autonomy, since such patients will not
have enough information to make an adequately informed
decision.18,21 For example, a patient who is told just the RRR of
mammography may fail to understand the small number of
patients who will benefit or the large number who must be
screened to prevent one death from breast cancer. In addition,
without information about absolute risk reduction, it is impossi-
ble to compare the value of different available preventive services
or to fully weigh the chance of benefit against the risk of harm.2
Some argue that interactive computer programs—often
called patient decision aids (PtDAs)—could do a good job of
providing such complete information.2,6,8 There is a growing
body of literature on introducing PtDAs into preventive medi-
cine,6,28 and a recent set of guidelines states that they should
provide data in terms of absolute probabilities.9 According to
these guidelines and other discussions, providing just RRR or
failing to give numbers at all is not an acceptable level of
disclosure.3,4,6,29
PROBLEMS WITH PROVIDING ABSOLUTE RISK
AND BENEFIT DATA
While this position is motivated by important ethical princi-
ples, we believe that there are significant difficulties that have
not been adequately discussed. The biggest problems stem
from the danger that patients will not understand the infor-
mation provided or will use the information in irrational ways.
Research shows that a large percentage of adults in the USA
have difficulty understanding numerical concepts in general
and that they have particular difficulty with probability state-
ments.30–34 And although these problems with numeracy
impact the understanding of RRR numbers as well, research
shows that patients have a better understanding of this
measure than ARR, NNT, or a combination of different ones.32
Studies also have shown limitations in the ability of physicians
to interpret statistics in this area.35
While some theorists advocate using graphs rather than
numbers to convey absolute risk and benefit data,5,36 research
shows that patients also have significant problems under-
standing charts, tables, and other illustrations.8,37 For exam-
ple, a chart of 1,000 stick-figures printed in various colors to
denote different outcomes, a popular way to graphically convey
information about natural frequencies, can be difficult for
patients to interpret and apply to a personal decision whether
to be screened.8,37
Psychological research shows, further, that evenwell-educated,
intelligent people do a poor job making decisions based on small
probabilities. Irrational parts of human cognition—referred to as
heuristics or biases by psychologists—may lead people to assign
excessive importance to events that are quite unlikely (e.g.,
according to Prospect theory38), or to underestimate the impor-
tance of such events (e.g., because of the optimismbias39–41 or the
threshold bias42). In any particular case, the way that the
information about absolute risks or benefits is presented may
determine the patient’s perception as much as the data them-
selves, depending on which heuristics come into play.42 These
aspects of human cognition have led some theorists to conclude
that numbers do not play a key role in human decisions about
how to act in the face of risk.43,44
All these observations raise important questions about the
value of providing absolute risk and benefit data to patients
considering recommended screening tests such as mammog-
raphy. If a given type of data will not help patients do a better
job of making decisions reflecting their values and desires,
then it will not further their autonomy.45
DISCUSSION
Advocates of disclosure of absolute risks and benefits may
respond to evidence about possible misunderstanding or
Schwartz and Meslin: Absolute Risk Reduction and Screening JGIM
misuse of the information by arguing that health-care provi-
ders simply need to do better a better job educating patients.
Initiatives could aim at improving numeracy and counter-
acting irrational heuristics and could seek to present informa-
tion that integrates risk and benefit data about multiple
screening tests.
But this proposal must be evaluated in light of the
challenges of educating patients sufficiently and the resources
that would be required to do so. Doctor visits are already
overcrowded with managing acute problems and chronic
diseases and instituting an ever-growing list of preventive
steps.46 While some of the education could be done by other
health-care providers, such as nurses or other staff, limita-
tions in availability and expertise would have to be ad-
dressed.47 Also, although PtDAs could play a key role in
informing patients, there would most likely still need to be
dedicated efforts by doctors or others to answer questions and
provide follow up discussion.47 Finally, all these activities
would incur expense for an uncompensated activity in a
health-care system whose costs are already growing beyond
all bounds.
Balancing these issues—the possible advantages of disclos-
ing absolute risk and benefit against the resources required to
do it right—requires careful examination of the relevant ethical
principles. And while respect for autonomy is central to health-
care ethics, it can be difficult to clarify what level of disclosure
or understanding is necessary for a specific patient in a
specific situation. Different patients, with varying interests,
goals, and levels of education, may well need different levels of
information to adequately consent to a medical interven-
tion.18,45,48,49 This variability supports an approach where
patients are given a standard body of information and are then
given an opportunity to ask questions or request more
information. Research confirms that people want varying
amounts of information concerning their medical care.49–51
Ethical principles provide little guidance on whether data
about absolute risks and benefits should be part of the
standard disclosure or should be seen as additional informa-
tion that some may want. One precept requires that each
patient be given any information that a reasonable person
would want to know.18 And although absolute risk and benefit
data are certainly relevant to a complete consideration, it
seems possible that this sort of data—which is confusing to
many and may not play a central role in human cognition—
may be something that would be desired by some reasonable
patients but not by others. In addition, some have argued that
low-risk, well-supported interventions may require significant-
ly less disclosure and discussion than other interventions.52,53
These issues emphasize the challenge of articulating the
ideal of patient autonomy and balancing it against other
medical goals, such as beneficence (doing what is best for the
patient).10 While there has been a long tradition in western
medical ethics of focusing on autonomy, that prioritization has
now been critiqued.49,54 And there is clearly an issue of
beneficence involved when health-care providers give informa-
tion that may lead their patients to reject preventive services
that have been proven to reduce morbidity or mortality. For
many interventions, patient uptake drops when additional
information concerning risk and benefit is provided, even when
those data generally support the intervention.23,55,56 Admit-
tedly, if a certain sort of information is central to decision-
making, then its disclosure is mandatory despite any effect on
well-being. For example, it would be unethical (and illegal) to
withhold information about the risks of operative complica-
tions from heart surgery. But this is not the case for data about
absolute probabilities of risk and benefit in screening tests.
Benefit and harm of such tests must be discussed, for
instance, but it is much less clear what level of precision is
necessary.
Hearing this, some will sense paternalism and reject such
considerations out of hand. And while this concern is impor-
tant—nobody wants a return to doctor-knows-best—it should
not lead us to disregard the concerns raised above. The simple
fact is that medicine has multiple goals, not just providing any
and all information that might be relevant.49,54 In almost all of
our daily decisions, and even in most medical contexts,
absolute risk and benefit data are not available or supplied.
In the end, numerous considerations should come into play
when deciding whether absolute risk and benefit data will be
presented to patients, and in what form, when discussing
recommended screening tests. Similar issues will come up in
other settings of preventive care, such as when patients are
considering long-term preventive treatments such as taking
medication for high blood pressure or choosing to have less
well-supported tests. In all these areas, decisions about how
much information should be disclosed to all patients must be
made in light of careful consideration of patient understanding
and possible impacts on uptake and well-being, using all
applicable ethical principles.
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